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MARTIN V. GRAVIS (#1237) 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2562 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 392-8231 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL MARTINEZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
JUDGE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
THIS IS AN APPEAL from the denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained 
through an illegal search. The defendant is charged with possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute, first degree felony pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 58-37-8(l)(al(iii), 
possession of dangerous weapon by restricted person, class A pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
76-10-503(3)(b), possession of a controlled substance, class B pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
58-37-8(2)(d), Interfering with arrest, class B pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 76-8-305, 
redlight violation, class C pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 41-6-24 and possession of drug 
paraphernalia, class B pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 58-37a-5(l). A motion to Suppress was 
held on October 25, 2004 and the Court issued it's decision on November 29, 2004. This Court 
has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
DID THE Trial Court correctly interpret Utah Code Annotated Title 41-6-166 in holding 
1 
that an officer can arrest a person for a violaiton of 41-6-etseq. Without showing that any of the 
four exceptions allowed by Utah Code Annotated 41-6-166 exist and therefore is the search 
incident to arrest a violation of the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution and Article I 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Lower Courts interpretation of of statutes are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Pixton 2004 UT. App 275, 98 P 3d 433. Utah Constitution Art. I Section 14 
Utah Code Annotated 
41-6-166. Appearance upon arrest for misdemeanor-Setting Bond. 
"Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of this [chapter 6]1 punishable asa 
misdemeanor, the arrested person, for the purpose of setting bond, shall in the following cases be 
taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the county in which the offense 
charged is alleged to have been committed and who has jurisdiction of such offense and is 
nearest or most accessible with reference to the place where said arrest is made in any of the 
following cases: 
(1) When a person arrested demands and immediate appearance before a magistrate. 
(2) When the perosn is arrested upon a charge of driving or beingin actual physical 
control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination thereof as 
prescribed in Section 41-6-44. 
(3) When the person is arrested upon a charge of failure to stop in the event of an accident 
causing death, personal injuries, or damage to property. 
(4) In any other event when the person arrested refuses to give his written promise to 
appear in Court as hereinafter provided, or when the discretion of the arresting officer, a written 
promise is insufficient." 
and all statute on crimes listed. 
1
 "... the reference to 'this act' should now properly be read 'this chapter,' meaning chapter 6." 
Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1201. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
WEBER-MORGAN Narcotics Strike Force agents Grogen and Johnson testified at the 
suppression hearing. 
On the night of June 16, 2004, Agents Grogen and Johnson were conducting surveillance 
of an Ogden house following complaints of drug trafficking. The agents set up in a school 
parking lot across the street from the house with two other agents. The agents were not in 
uniform and each drove an unmarked vehicle. 
During the course of the evening, the agents observed Martinez leave the house under 
surveillance on a motorcycle. Martinez crossed the street to the parking lot, circled the agents, 
then committed several traffic violations while returning to the house, namely, failing to stop at a 
stop sign and giving a right hand turn signal while turning left. 
After several minutes, Martinez left the house a second time and proceeded to drive the 
motorcycle eastbount on Harrison Boulevard. Agent Johnson followed, and observed further 
traffic violations by Martinez-failing to stop pursuant to a traffic control device and turning 
without signaling at the intersection of 20T H Street and Harrison Boulevard. 
Agent Johnson initiated a traffic stop. Martinez stopped the motorcycle and dismounted. 
Shortly thereafter, Agents Grogen and Weiss arrived at the scened. Agent Johnson stepped away 
to check for a valid license and registration and outstanding warrants. Agent Grogen informed 
Martinez that he was under arrest for the observed traffic violations. Martinez backed up as 
though attempting to get away, but was restrained and handcuffed by Agents Grogen and Weis. 
Believing that his assistance in restraining Martinez might be needed, Agent Johnson 
reapproached Martinez, Grogen and Weiss. Agent Johnson observed a large bulge in the front 
waistband area of Martinez pants. When initially stopped, Martinez had been carrying a large 
sheath knife and butterfly knife. Agent Johnson asked Martinez what was in his pants. Agent 
Johnson testified that he was concerned that the bulge might be a concealed weapon. Martinez 
began to struggle and made an effort to hide the bulge from view. Agen Johnson searched 
Martinez and removed a black case or pouch from Martinez' waistband area, which was found to 
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contain drug paraphernalia and substances appearing to be marijuana and methamphetamine. 
Martinez was subsequently booked and charged by information with, among other things, 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-
37-8(l)(a)(iii). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
THE SEARCH of the defendant was illegal since he was arrested in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated 41-6-166. He was arrested for a red light violation which is clearly a violatio of Utah 
Code Annotated 41-6-et seq. And none of the four exception allows an officer to arrest and 
individual for violation of Utah Code Annotated 41-6-et seq. were present. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ARREST of the defendant was in violation of Utah Code Annotated 41-6-166 and 
therefore the evidence obtained in the search incident to arrest should be suppressed 
This issue was raised in the case of State v. Harmon, (854 P2d 1037 Utah App. 1993) 910 
P2d 1196 (Utah 1995). In that case the Courts did not decide this issue since the defendant was 
arrested for driving on suspension which is not a violation of 41-6-et sez. 
In that case, the Court stated as follows: 
These factors notwithstanding, we conclude that Harmon's arrest for driving on 
suspension was not unreasonable in light of the governmental interest in removing unlicensed 
drivers from the road for public safety reasons. Other jurisdictions have uniformly held that 
driving on suspension is sufficiently serious to justify the offender's arrest rather that mere 
detention and citation. See, e.g., State v. S.P., 580 S.2d 216, 217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review 
denied, 592 So.2d 682 (1991); People v. Anderson, 169 111. App.3d 289, 120 111. Dec. 123, 129, 
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523 N.E.2d 1034, 1040, appeal denied, 122 I11.2d 579, 125 Ill.Dec.223, 530 N.E.2d 251 (1988), 
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cert denied, 490 U.S. 1036, 109 S.Ct. 1935, 104 L.Ed.2d 407 (1989); State v. Pierce, 136 N.J. 
184, 642 A.2d 947, 958 (1994) (upholding arrest in part because driving on suspension "poses 
grave danger to the public"); State v. Hollis, 161 Vt. 87, 633 A.2d 1362, 1364 (1993); State v. 
Reding, 119Wn.2d685, 835 P.2d 1019, 1023 (1992) (overruling prior contrary authority). [fnlO] 
Harmon has not identified, and we have not found, a single case where an arrest for driving on 
suspension has been held to be unconstitutional. 
This holding should be construed narrowly and does not necessarily apply to other traffic 
violations. "It should be the policy of every law enforcement agency to issue citations in lieu of 
arrest or continued custody to the maximum extent at 432(citing A.B.A. Standards Relating to 
Pretrial Release §2.1 (Approved Draft, 1968)); see also Parker, 834 P.2d at 595 ("[I]t is difficult 
to imagine any circumstances surrounding a routine traffic stop in which [an arrest] would be 
justified."). As we stated in Lopez: 
[A]n officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and vehicle 
registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation. However, once the driver has 
produced a valid driver's license an devidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, "he must be 
allowed to proceed on his way, without being subjected to further delay by police for additional 
questioning." 
The trial court in this case did construe the law narrowly in holding that an officer can 
arrest for a traffic violation at any time that the officer chooses. If an officer can arrest a traffic 
offender at any time he chooses then Utah Code Annotated 41-6-166 is meaningless. 
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CONCLUSION 
BASED UPON the foregoing, the defendant respectfully request that this Court reverse the 
denial of the Motion to Suppress. 
DATED THIS 7 ^ day of May, 2005. 
UtfTN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL LEROY MARTINEZ, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Judge John R. Morris 
Case No. 041904034 
This case is before the court on a motion to suppress. 
FACTS 
Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force agents Grogen and Johnson testified at the suppression 
hearing. 
On the night of June 16, 2004, Agents Grogen and Johnson were conducting surveillance of 
an Ogden house following complaints of drug trafficking. The agents set up in a school parking lot 
across the street from the house with two other agents. The agents were not in uniform and each 
drove an unmarked vehicle. 
During the course of the evening, the agents observed Martinez leave the house under 
surveillance on a motorcycle. Martinez crossed the street to the parking lot, circled the agents, then 
committed several traffic violations while returning to the house, namely, failing to stop at a stop 
sign and giving a right hand turn signal while turning left. 
After several minutes, Martinez left the house a second time and proceeded to drive the 
motorcycle eastbound on Harrison Boulevard. Agent Johnson followed, and observed further traffic 
Ruling 
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violations by Martinez-failing to stop pursuant to a traffic control device and turning without 
signaling- at the intersection of 20th Street and Harrison Boulevard. 
Agent Johnson initiated a traffic stop. Martinez stopped the motorcycle and dismounted. 
Shortly thereafter, Agents Grogen and Weiss arrived at the scene. Agent Johnson stepped away to 
check for a valid license and registration and outstanding warrants. Agent Grogen informed Martinez 
that he was under arrest for the observed traffic violations. Martinez backed up as though attempting 
to get away, but was restrained and handcuffed by Agents Grogen and Weiss. 
Believing that his assistance in restraining Martinez might be needed, Agent Johnson re-
approached Martinez, Grogen and Weiss. Agent Johnson observed a large bulge in the front 
waistband area of Martinez pants. When initially stopped, Martinez had been carrying a large sheath 
knife and a butterfly knife. Agent Jolinson asked Martinez what was in his pants. Agent Johnson 
testified that he was concerned that the bulge might be a concealed weapon. Martinez began to 
struggle and made an effort to hide the bulge from view. Agent Johnson searched Martinez and 
removed a black case or pouch from Martinez' waistband area, which was found to contain drug 
paraphernalia and substances appearing to be marijuana and methamphetamine. 
Martinez was subsequently booked and charged by information with, among other things, 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(iii). 
ANALYSIS 
Martinez asks the court to suppress the evidence obtained upon search on the ground that a 
peace officer's authority to arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation is limited by Utah Code Ann. 
Ruling 
Case No. 041904034 
Page 3 of 12 
§§41-6-166,-167 and -169. Martinez also argues that the arrest was improper since it was motivated 
by the agents1 desire to search Martinez and his motorcycle, and that an arrest for a misdemeanor 
traffic violation should fail on Fourth Amendment grounds. 
A peace officer's authority to make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation 
was raised but not decided in State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995). In Harmon, the Utah 
Supreme Court determined that sections 166 and 167 apply only to arrests for violations of title 41, 
chapter 6, and therefore did not apply to the violation for which Harmon was arrested. The Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a peace officer's authority to make a warrantless arrest for 
misdemeanor speeding violations without examination of section 41-6-166. United States v. Lugo, 
170 F.3d 996 (10th Cir. 1999). 
Statutory Authority to Arrest 
Martinez asserts that a peace officer's authority to arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation 
is limited by sections 41-6-166, -167 and -169. Those sections provide: 
41-6-166. Appearance upon arrest for misdemeanor-Setting bond. 
Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of this [chapter 6]1 punishable as a 
misdemeanor, the arrested person, for the purpose of setting bond, shall in the following cases be 
taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the county in which the offense charged 
is alleged to have been committed and who has jurisdiction of such offense and is nearest or most 
accessible with reference to the place where said arrest is made, in any of the following cases: 
(1) When a person arrested demands an immediate appearance before a magistrate. 
(2) When the person is arrested upon a charge of driving or being in actual physical control 
of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination thereof as prescribed in 
Section 41-6-44. 
1 u
... the reference to 'this act' should now properly be read 'this chapter/ meaning chapter 6." 
Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1201. 
Ruling 
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(3) When the person is arrested upon a charge of failure to stop in the event of an accident 
causing death, personal injuries, or damage to property. 
(4) In any other event when the person arrested refuses to give his written promise to appear 
in court as hereinafter provided, or when in the discretion of the arresting officer, a written promise 
to appear is insufficient. 
41-6-167. Notice to appear in court-Contents-Promise to comply-Signing-Release from 
custody -Official misconduct. 
(1) Upon any violation of this act punishable as a misdemeanor, whenever a person is [not]2 
immediately taken before a magistrate as hereinbefore provided, the peace officer shall prepare, in 
triplicate or more copies, a written notice to appear in court containing: 
(a) the name and address of the person; 
(b) the number, if any, of the person's operator's license; 
(c) the registration number of the person's vehicle; 
(d) the offense charged; and 
(e) the time and place the person shall appear in court. 
(2) The time specified in the notice to appear must be at least five days after the arrest of the 
person unless the person demands an earlier hearing. 
(3) The place specified in the notice to appear shall be made before a magistrate of competent 
jurisdiction in the county in which the alleged violation occurred. 
(4) (a) In order to secure release as provided in this section, the arrested person shall promise 
to appear in court by signing at least one copy of the written notice prepared by the arresting officer. 
(b) The arresting officer shall immediately: 
(i) deliver a copy of the notice to the person promising to appear; and 
"The word 'not' was included in the original 1941 bill but was accidentally omitted when the 
bill was enrolled. See 1941 Utah Laws 139; 1949 Utah Laws 186. We have previously held that 
'the only logical reading of the statute is that it has application only when a citation is issued in 
lieu of an arrest and no appearance is made before a magistrate.' Woytko v. Browning, 659 P.2d 
1058, 1061 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added). Thus, the statute should read 'whenever a person is 
not immediately taken before a magistrate.'" Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1200, fn 6. 
Ruling 
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(ii) release the person arrested from custody. 
(5) Any officer violating any of the provisions of this section shall be: 
(a) guilty of misconduct in office; and 
(b) subject to removal from office. 
41-6-169. Arrests without warrants. 
The foregoing provisions of this act shall govern all peace officers in making arrests without 
warrant for violations of this act, but the procedure prescribed herein shall not otherwise be exclusive 
of any other method prescribed by law for the arrest and prosecution of a person for an offense of 
like grade. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-166, -167, 169. 
Martinez contends that arrests for misdemeanor traffic violations are authorized in only the 
four specific circumstances enumerated in section 166: (1) when the person arrested demands to see 
a magistrate, (2) when arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, 
(3) when arrested for hit and run, or (4) when the person arrested refuses to sign the promise to 
appear contained in the citation or when, in the discretion of the officer, the written promise to 
appear is insufficient. 
For all misdemeanor traffic violations not within these four circumstances, Martinez argues 
that section 169 gives peace officers authority only to issue a citation under section 167, after which 
the suspect must be released. 
However, neither sections 166, 167,169 nor the other provisions of title 41, chapter 6 confer 
arrest authority on peace officers. That authority is found in Utah's general statute governing arrests, 
which provides that cwa peace officer ... may, without warrant arrest a person: ... (I) for any public 
Ruling 
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offense committed or attempted in the presence of any peace officer... ." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 
(emphasis added). 
Furthermore, the authority to issue citations for misdemeanor traffic violations (other than 
parking violations under section 41-6-19.5) is not found in those sections or anywhere in chapter 6. 
That authority is also found in the general arrest statute: "A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person 
into custody ... may issue and deliver a citation requiring any person subject to arrest or prosecution 
on a misdemeanor or infraction charge to appear at the court of the magistrate before whom the 
person should be taken pursuant to law if the person had been arrested." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-18 
(emphasis added). 
Sections 77-7-2 and 77-7-18 are both written in the permissive voice "may," and confer 
authority on peace officers to arrest a suspect for any ''public offense" committed in their presence 
or. in the peace officer's discretion, to cite the suspect for any "misdemeanor or infraction" for which 
the suspect would otherwise be subject to arrest or prosecution. 
It is uncontested that Martinez committed multiple misdemeanor traffic violations in the 
agents' presence. Therefore, the agents were statutorily authorized to arrest or cite Martinez in their 
discretion under sections 77-7-2 and 77-7-18. 
Addressing Martinez' argument, the court must determine whether or not in certain 
circumstances sections 166, 167 and 169 limit the general authority of a peace office to arrest, or 
require the issuance of a citation instead of an arrest for a traffic misdemeanor. " . . . 41-6-169 mkes 
[sic] it clear that the officer must make an arrest or issue a citation pursuant to the [sic] 41-6-166 and 
41-6-167." (Defendant's Reply Memo, p. 2). The court concludes they do not. 
Ruling 
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In construing sections 166,167 and 169, the "primary rule ... is to give effect to the intent of 
the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. To discover that intent, we 
look first to the plain language of the statute. In construing a statute, we assume that each term in the 
statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, 
Moreover, "[w]e read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions 
in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 
12, }^ 17. "It is our duty to construe each act of the legislature so as to give it full force and effect. 
When a construction of an act will bring it into serious conflict with another act, our duty is to 
construe the acts to be in harmony and avoid conflicts." Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770, 773 
(Utah 1991). 
Sections 166, 167 and 169 presuppose that an arrest has taken place. Section 166 applies 
"[wjhenever any person is arrested for any violation of this act punishable as a misdemeanor." That 
section describes the procedure to be followed for appearance and setting bond once an arrest has 
been made: the arrested person "shall... be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate" in 
the enumerated circumstances. 
Section 167 further describes the post arrest procedure to be followed "whenever a person is 
[not] immediately taken before a magistrate as hereinbefore provided." The phrase "as hereinbefore 
provided" can only refer to section 166, and the phrase "as hereinafter provided" in section 166(4) 
can only refer to section 167. Read together, sections 166 and 167 impose a procedural requirement 
Ruling 
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that persons arrested for misdemeanor traffic violations be taken to a magistrate "without 
unnecessary delay" or, where not so taken before a magistrate, given a citation and released. 
Section 169 requires that sections 166 and 167 be followed for warrantless arrests for traffic 
misdemeanor violations under chapter 6. Specifically, section 169 imposes "the procedure prescribed 
herein"-i.e., the post arrest procedures contained in sections 166 arid 167-where not in conflict with 
other law. 
For these reasons, the court reads sections 166, 167 and 169 as procedural rules for peace 
officers to follow once an arrest has been made for misdemeanor traffic violations under chapter 6, 
containing neither a grant of limited authority to arrest without warrant nor a restriction or limitation 
of any such authority. Those sections are consistent with, and do not supersede, conflict with or 
restrict a peace officer's general authority to make a warrantless arrest for any public offense 
committed or attempted in the officer's presence under section 77-7-2. 
The agents' statutory authority to arrest Martinez was not restricted or limited by sections 
166,167 and 169. The arrest was therefore valid and the subsequent search was a search incident to 
arrest. 
Reasonableness of the Arrest 
Martinez also raises issues under the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution, which 
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. "He had a valid driver's license and there were no 
warrants for his arrest and was a resident of Ogden but the officers did not even attempt to issue a 
citation but instead arrested the Martinez solely for the purpose of searching him and his motorcycle 
Ruling 
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and therefore the arrest was illegal and the evidence obtained should be suppressed." Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support Thereof, p. 2. 
Martinez' first constitutional argument is that the "pretext doctrine" should invalidate his 
arrest. That doctrine was rejected in State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994) (in the case of 
temporary stops for traffic violations); State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232 (Utah), cert, denied, 114 S. 
Ct. 476,126 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1993) (arrest for parole violation; however, the pretext doctrine was not 
squarely before the court); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) (traffic stop and subsequent 
arrest of a passenger for giving false personal information to a peace officer), and State v. Harmon, 
910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995) (traffic violation outside chapter 6). 
"In attempting to apply the pretext doctrine, [defendant] argues that her arrest was 
unconstitutional because even if she 'could' have been arrested for driving on suspension, a 
reasonable officer ... 'would' not have done so. After considering our opinions in Lopez, Archuleta, 
and Pena, as well as cases from other jurisdictions, we conclude that the 'pretext arrest' analysis 
should be rejected for many of the same reasons that we rejected the 'pretext stop* analysis. The 
validity of an arrest must be analyzed on objective criteria, not on an officer's subjective motivations 
or suspicions. Inquiring into 'what a reasonable officer would do' focuses on a question that is 
falsely objective, 'fails to provide the consistency and predictability officers need,' and ignores the 
possibility that usual police practice may be unconstitutional." Harmon, 91 OP.2d at 1206 (citations 
omitted). 
"If police have a valid right to arrest an individual for one crime, it does not matter if their 
subjective intent is in reality to collect information concerning another crime. ... In other words, if 
Ruling 
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the alleged pretext arrest could have taken place absent police suspicion of the defendant's 
involvement in another crime, then the arrest is lawful. ... The arrest was not rendered invalid solely 
because the officers had a separate motive for arresting him ... ." Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1238. 
Martinez' second constitutional argument is directed to the reasonableness of his arrest. 
Martinez concedes that the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation 
despite a Fourth Amendment challenge in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). "The State 
has correctly stated the law under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but the 
State of Utah can interpret its constitution to provide more protection from the government then [sic] 
the United States Constitution provides, [citations omitted] Also, the legislature of the State of Utah 
is free to provide greater protection then [sic] is provided by the U.S. Constitution and that is exactly 
what 41-6-166 does by limiting when the police can arrest a person for a violation of a traffic 
offense." Defendant's Reply Memo, p. 2. Martinez attempts to distinguish Atwater "since Texas law 
provided the officer the right to arrest for that violation." Id. 
The court does not find that Martinez' arrest was unreasonable under the Utah Constitution. 
"In Lopez, we concluded that 'because the pretext doctrine is unsound, we refuse to adopt it under 
article I, section 14 . . . of the Utah Constitution.' This holding also applies to pretext arrests." 
Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1206 (citation omitted). 
In construing statutes, the court will "avoid interpretations that conflict with relevant 
constitutional mandates." State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1009 (Utah 1995) "[W]e have a duty to 
construe statutes to avoid constitutional conflicts." Provo City Corp. v. State, 795 P.2d 1120, 1125 
(Utah 1990). 
Ruling 
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Under section 77-7-2, the agents had probable cause and authority to arrest Martinez for 
observed misdemeanor traffic violations. The court interprets sections 166,167 and 169 as imposing 
additional procedural requirements in connection with such arrests. Such procedures address possible 
abuses of a peace officer's discretionary arrest authority. 
"The purpose of the statute [chapter 6] is two-fold. First, it preserves the rights of a person 
arrested by insuring that he be afforded a prompt opportunity to effect his release from custody. 
Second, it prevents the arresting officer from being selective in determining before which magistrate 
the charge will be lodged and tried." Woytko, 659 P.2d at 1060 (Utah 1983). 
The reasonableness of warrantless arrests for misdemeanor traffic violations is therefore 
addressed, and Martinez' rights are preserved, in the procedures applicable to such arrests as enacted 
by the legislature in chapter 6, and specifically in sections 166, 167 and 169. Accordingly, the court 
declines to invalidate arrests under the general arrest statute as applied to misdemeanor traffic 
violations, or to impose additional procedures or analysis on such arrests. 
CONCLUSION 
Martinez' motion to suppress is denied. 
Dated November 29, 2004. 
Jdm R. Morris, Judge 
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